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Abstract
This paper focuses on an investigation into the
operational safety aspects of advanced Terrain
Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS),
conducted under contract to the Netherlands
Directorate General of Civil Aviation (RLD). The
TAWS depicts graphical terrain information on a
Navigation Display (ND) and provides predictive
terrain collision alerting. Initially, several ND terrain
format displays were evaluated in an exploratory
workstation study. The most preferred display format
was adopted for follow-up evaluations in a piloted
simulation programme. The objective of phase two
was to evaluate the independent effects of terrain
awareness information and predictive terrain alerting.
The NLR Research Flight Simulator employing the
Fokker 100 model served as the test facility. Ten
evaluation crews flew fourteen scenarios each,
primarily in terrain-rich environments.
The subjects generally had little difficulty in
becoming accustomed to the displayed terrain
information and comments indicated a marked
improvement in terrain situational awareness.
Analysis shows a significant improvement in terrain
situational awareness and speed of detecting
potential terrain critical situations. The terrain
display provided sufficient spatial awareness to the
extent that the conditions generating a predictive
alert developed relatively few times. The crews did
not perceive a marked improvement in terrain
situational awareness from the predictive terrain
proximity alerting. However, the additional safety
margin provided by this alerting algorithm was still
regarded a valuable asset. Relatively few crews
noticed anomalies on the terrain display associated
with TAWS database errors.
Abbreviations
ATC Air Traffic Control
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain
DH Decision Height
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning
System
FMS Flight Management System
FSF Flight Safety Foundation
GCAS Ground Collision Avoidance System
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
MDA Minimum Descent Altitude
ND Navigation Display
PFD Primary Flight Display
QNH Altimeter sub-scale setting to obtain
elevation relative to mean sea level
RLD Rijksluchtvaartdienst; Directorate General
of Civil Aviation of the Netherlands
RFS Research Flight Simulator
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
TAWS Terrain Awareness and Warning System
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System
Introduction
It is generally accepted that Controlled Flight Into
Terrain (CFIT) is one of the leading categories of
civil aircraft accidents. Recent safety studies include
those conducted by the Flight Safety Foundation
(FSF)/ICAO CFIT and Approach & Landing
Accident Reduction Task Forces1,2,3. These Task
Forces recommended the application of advanced
technology to improve situational awareness in the
cockpit. Currently, several avionics manufacturers
are developing and some are already marketing such
technology, most notably in the form of depicting
graphical terrain information on the already installed
EFIS displays. Current regulatory activity from the
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FAA and ICAO is focused on rule making for
mandating the installation of TAWS. In March 1999,
ICAO adopted amendments to Annex 6, Parts I and
II, which introduce requirements for a predictive
terrain hazard warning function in the GPWS (i.e.
EGPWS, GCAS or TAWS). The Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) has published human
factors guidelines4 for the development of these
systems.
The introduction of such terrain awareness displays
as well as predictive terrain warning systems will
impact flight crew operational procedures. These
systems are likely to influence the crew’s spatial
awareness as well as their reaction to ground
proximity alerts occurring in combination with such
displays. For shared displays, in which terrain is one
of several types of information that can be depicted,
information prioritisation, discrimination of terrain
information, consistency of coding and symbology
and potential clutter are just some of the issues that
need to be addressed.
The investigation, on behalf of the RLD, was carried
out into the operational safety aspects of TAWS. The
objective was to evaluate the independent effects of
terrain awareness information and predictive terrain
alerting. More complete details of the study are given
in Ref.5.  The current study adds to other recent
research conducted on the subject of terrain
depiction in the flight deck6,7.
Workstation Pilot Study
The objective of the initial phase of the study was to
select a representative TAWS type system that could
be pursued further in a full mission research
simulator. Therefore, prior to the piloted flight
simulator evaluation, a workstation experiment was
conducted to assess candidate Navigation Display
formats depicting terrain. Eight technical airline
pilots from local carriers served as test subjects.
Evaluation variables included:
• Colour coding schemes to depict terrain altitude
relative to aircraft, e.g. grey, green or brown tints,
or combinations, as well as current weather radar
colours (red, yellow and green);
• Altitude spacing between terrain contours - 500
or 1000ft intervals;
• The relative altitude below the aircraft at which
not to depict terrain.
Although the displays presented were “static”, pilots
were able to vary aircraft altitude and position to
mimic a dynamic terrain display. In summary, the
subjective workstation evaluation generated the
following recommendations:
• The preferred format for the terrain colour coding
was based on brown tints, comparable to that for
paper navigation charts, e.g. Jeppesen;
• Darker colours to indicate higher terrain
elevations, as opposed to dark colours for low
terrain, were preferred – just as for paper charts
that depict terrain contours;
• 1000ft altitude intervals between terrain contours
was the preferred format when compared to the
use of 500ft intervals;
• The use of grey colour coding for displaying
terrain below the aircraft was not received well.
The preferred approach was to maintain a similar
colour scheme as used for terrain depiction above
the aircraft – since both were considered hazards
to ultimately avoid.
These results were used to code the format used in
the flight simulator evaluation described below.
Objectives of the Simulator Evaluation
The objective of phase two was to evaluate the
independent effects of terrain awareness information
and predictive terrain alerting. In particular the
influence on spatial awareness and crew decision
making were central to this study.
The basic hypotheses formulated for the experiment
design were as follows:
- Crew acceptability of the TAWS function is
high;
- The introduction of predictive terrain alerting
leads to fewer terrain critical situations than
systems with reactive alerting;
- A graphical terrain display leads to earlier crew
recognition of potential terrain conflicts and
facilitates improved crew decision-making.
The investigation also included the observation of
crew behaviour following terrain alerts and when
erroneous terrain was displayed due to database
anomalies.
The 2x2 matrix below represents the evaluation
independent variables (awareness and alerting type).
Note that ‘alerting type’ refers specifically to those
aural and visual alerts associated with potential
impact with terrain (and not the relative terrain
altitude coding for the display).
Table 1: Interface definition matrix
Standard
Nav. Display
Nav. Display
& Terrain Data
Reactive alerting Interface A(GPWS) Interface B
Predictive
alerting Interface C
Interface D
(TAWS)
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Interface A represents the GPWS (reactive alerting
based on current conditions, e.g. Radio altimeter,
barometric descent rate, etc). This is also the
reference treatment condition. Interface B is a GPWS
supplemented by a terrain awareness display (and
therefore does not provide predictive alerting).
Interface D equates to TAWS with complete system
functionality. Interface C represents a TAWS type
system minus the terrain awareness display
(predictive alerting only). For each of the interfaces
in Table 1, GPWS Mk 5 functionality was always
provided as standard - the terrain display and
predictive alerts supplement the basic GPWS.
Simulation Facility
The piloted evaluation program was executed using
the NLR’s Research Flight Simulator (RFS). The
RFS features a modern civil transport aircraft glass
cockpit, with a moving base motion platform and
both terrain model board and computer generated
visual system. An Air Traffic Control (ATC)
controller station is fully coupled to the RFS. The
various aircraft simulation models, avionics sub-
systems and cockpit displays that are available can be
tailored for a specific type of investigation. For the
purpose of this evaluation, the RFS was programmed
to simulate a Fokker 100 aircraft. Figure 1 presents
the RFS cockpit set-up.
Figure 1: Research Flight Simulator Cockpit Layout
Although the cockpit layout does not resemble that of
the actual aircraft, system functionality was emulated
to the maximum extent possible. The standard
Fokker 100 Primary Flight Display (PFD) and
Navigation Display (ND) formats, and Engine
Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) were
used. The Flight Management System, two Control
Display Units, integrated Autopilot/Flight Director
and Autothrottle were also used for the evaluation.
The Flight Control Panel is glareshield mounted as
shown above.
Terrain Awareness and Warning System Description
The experimental TAWS comprised the following
visual and aural information:
- Graphical depiction of relative terrain elevation
on the ND employing brown contours;
- Yellow and red alerting areas on the NDs to
provide a visual indication of the predicted
collision area associated with terrain cautions and
warnings respectively. The caution and warning
alerts are based on a 60 and 30 second look-ahead
respectively, using current aircraft altitude,
position, airspeed, descent rate, turn rate, and an
on-board terrain database;
- Aural alerts (“Caution Terrain” and “Terrain
Ahead - Pull-up”) combined with the above visual
alerts;
- Terrain proximity warnings and cautions
annunciated through the master/caution lamp on
the glareshield panel;
- Depiction of a lateral trend vector (predicted
flight path over next 30 seconds) on the ND in
yellow.
In order to pursue the objectives of the current
investigation, terrain was displayed full-time (as
opposed to pilot selectable). The display range was
pilot selectable. As an example, Figure 2 shows the
ND during approach into Mexico City.
Figure 2: Navigation Display with Relative Terrain
Elevation Information
The coding of relative terrain depiction above is
defined using the sideview in Figure 3.
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+1000ft
-1000ft
-100ft
>1000ft above
> 1000ft below
Figure 3: Colour Coding for Relative Terrain
Depiction on ND
Experimental Design
A great challenge in the experimental design was the
expected anticipation by test subjects that terrain
collisions and/or dangerous proximity to terrain
would occur during the experiment - as the pilots
would be aware of the nature of the evaluation.
Similarly, it was anticipated that subject pilots were
unlikely to frequently encounter situations involving
terrain alerts during the experiment since they would
adhere to given clearances and also strictly follow
prescribed Standard Operating Procedures.
Reproduction of the complex accident causal chains
in an experimental set-up is difficult to achieve. In
addition, it was anticipated that there would be a
significant learning effect for a particular crew in
cases where they were exposed to abnormal
situations and emergencies more than once. Exposing
subjects to these latter conditions with more than one
candidate interface was therefore avoided.
For the reasons stated above, a mixed experimental
design was adopted. Two subject groups, each of five
crews (Captain and First Officer), were each exposed
to only two interfaces in Table 1. Each subject group
evaluates the two interfaces in a repeated measures
fashion, and the two subject groups themselves are
involved in a randomised subject design. The
evaluation of the individual effects of both terrain
display information and that of predictive terrain
proximity alerting could be investigated in this way.
Scenario Matrix Selection
An attempt was made to include scenarios
representative of typical CFIT accidents1,2,3, 8 within
the constraints of an experimental set-up. Secondary
tasks (e.g. full engine fire drill) were employed to
introduce distractions and increase workload. The
scenarios were primarily flown in a high terrain
environment  (Mexico City and Innsbruck), but a
number of approaches were also flown in a flat
terrain area (Amsterdam Airport Schiphol).
Moreover, it is known that CFIT accidents also
involve landing short and do occur in areas absent of
high terrain1. All scenarios were flown under low
visibility conditions, obscuring terrain features. All
approach scenarios were initiated at an altitude of
16000ft and indicated airspeed of 250kts, which
resulted in average flight times of 15 minutes to
touchdown. The departure scenarios involved a take-
off and subsequent routing along the published
standard instrument departure. These simulations
were stopped once the aircraft had safely climbed
above the surrounding terrain, i.e. above 14000ft.
The scenarios employed are described below and
presented in Table 2.
Normal, uneventful flights Radar vectoring,
published SIDs, STARs and both precision and non-
precision approaches. See scenarios 2-4 in Table 2.
Incorrect radar vectors towards rising terrain
Scenarios 5a-b. The engine fire in scenario 5a
introduced distractions and additional workload. A
given crew tested one interface only for each
scenario. This scenario addresses display and alerting
effects.
Incorrect altimeter settings/incorrect QNH Crews
were unknowingly presented with incorrect QNH,
placing the aircraft lower than indicated on the
altimeter. See scenarios 6a-b in Table 2. A given
crew tested one interface only for each scenario.
Scenario 6 addresses the effect of the display.
Terrain database integrity There has been some
debate in industry regarding crew response in cases
where the system presents information based on
erroneous terrain data.  Scenario 7a included
incorrect co-ordinate data, laterally shifting terrain
below the departure route on the ND. Scenario 7b
included incorrect (i.e. higher) altitude information of
some elevated terrain below the arrival route. A given
crew tested one interface only for each scenario.
False/nuisance GPWS terrain alerts Scenario 8
included a false “terrain” alert shortly before
reaching the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA).
The scenario was selected to analyse crew tactical
decision making following a terrain alert under
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).   In
several fatal CFIT accidents the crew continued
descent despite a valid terrain warning, potentially as
a result of loss of trust in the system due to earlier
nuisance alerts1.
Missed approaches The scenario involving crew
exposure to missed approaches was combined with
that involving false GPWS terrain alerts in scenario
8. After completing the required terrain evasive
-7-
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manoeuvre, the specific terrain situation required the
crew to continue on the published missed approach
procedure.
Subject pilot group I was exposed to a sequence of
scenarios using interfaces A and B, whereas group II
used interfaces C and D (see Table 1 and 3). Within
each pilot group, all were exposed to identical
scenarios, the only difference being the scenario
order was randomised. The scenarios flown per
interface were identical with the exception of those
scenarios that could not be realistically repeated with
the alternative interface (for a given crew) because of
the learning effect. In those cases an alternative
scenario with similar generic characteristics was used
- see scenarios 5-7, Table 3.
Table 2: Overview of Evaluation Scenarios
Scenario
code/description Anomaly/Event
#2
Amsterdam VOR/DME
Alfa approach runway 24
None
#3
Innsbruck LOC/DME
East approach runway 26
None
#4
Mexico Jusco2 departure
from runway 23L
None
#5a
Mexico Visos1departure
from runway 05R
Radar vectors toward
rising terrain after
engine failure
#5b
Mexico Coapa4 arrival
with rwy 23L approach
Radar vectors toward
rising terrain off the
standard arrival route
#6a
Mexico Otumba2 arrival
with rwy 23L approach
Altimeter setting error
imposed on the crew
#6b
Innsbruck LOC/DME
west approach runway 26
Altimeter setting error
imposed on the crew
#7a
Mexico Arcos1 departure
from runway 05R
Terrain database
error mountain next to
airport is shown under
departure route on ND
#7b
Mexico Otumba2 arrival
with rwy 23L approach
Terrain database
error terrain next to
route is depicted
higher on ND
#8
Innsbruck LOC/DME
East approach runway 26
False GPWS “Terrain”
alert
Table 3: Scenarios Per Subject Group and Interface
Subject
group
Group I
(Crews 1-5)
Group II
(Crews 6-10)
Interface
Scenario
A B C D
2
3
4
5a
5b
6a
6b
7a
7b
8
x
x
x
  x*
  x*
x
x
x
x
x
  x*
  x*
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
  x*
  x*
x
x
x
x
x
x
  x*
  x*
x
x
x
Runs/crew 6 8 7 7
- *  only one, either scenario 5a or 5b for each
interface per crew
Operational Procedures
To reduce experimental variability a number of
variables were controlled, including operational
variables discussed here. All flight crews were
furnished with a generic set of Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) (only those relevant to the
experiment) in advance. The SOPs were based on the
aircraft operations manual of a major European
Fokker 100 operator. Crew co-ordination procedures
for take-off & climb, approach & landing, go-around
and GPWS & TAWS recovery were provided. For all
GPWS and TAWS warnings, the crews were required
to execute an immediate maximum performance
climb until the warning ceased and the crew
determined that terrain clearance was assured. The
only exception to the immediate climb was for clear
daylight Visual Meteorological Conditions when the
flight crew could immediately and unequivocally
confirm a false warning. This procedure is consistent
with a recent FSF Safety Alert. For a TAWS Caution
Terrain alert crews were required to correct flight
path or perform the terrain avoidance if safe terrain
clearance was in doubt. Full details are given in Ref.
5.  Subjects were clearly briefed that the intended use
of terrain display was for “pilot awareness” only, not
for “navigation” or “escape guidance”.
For all evaluation runs the Captain was designated
pilot flying.
KLM navigation charts that depict brown terrain
contours were employed. As the terrain display was
displayed full-time for the purposes of the
experiment, weather radar was not available.
-8-
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Test Subjects
Ten European airline flight crews with jet transport
experience conducted the evaluation. The 20
subjects, all with glass cockpit experience, were
familiar with GPWS operation and related
procedures for their current aircraft. Average Captain
experience and age were10000 hours (range 3300-
22000 hours) and 44 years respectively. Average
First Officer experience and age were 3300 hours
(range 1700-5000 hours) and 31 years respectively.
Evaluation Procedure
The simulator evaluation was conducted during
August 1997 and each crew was required to attend
the NLR simulation facility for a single day. Each
crew was furnished with a written briefing guide
prior to their arrival. Following a pre-test verbal
briefing, a training session in the RFS familiarised
crews with the simulator, evaluation systems and
procedures. The remainder of the day was used to
conduct the crew’s schedule of 14 evaluation runs.
Data Collection
Data collection before, during and after the
evaluation runs consisted of:
- A pre-experiment questionnaire, i.e. pilot’s flying
background, experience and opinion/knowledge
of onboard terrain warning systems;
- Subjective comments following each scenario;
- Quantitative data per run such as aircraft states
(e.g. altitude, position, body attitudes), system
parameters (e.g. AP modes engaged, alerts
generated) power plant data (throttle position,
engine indications), configuration data (e.g. flap,
gear), etc;
- Qualitative interface rating questionnaire after
completing the series of runs using one interface
type;
- A post-experiment questionnaire to qualitatively
compare the interfaces tested and assess overall
pilot acceptability.
Results and Discussion
Qualitative Analysis
The post-test questionnaire for each interface type
considered the following factors:
- the amount of information to assure sufficient
terrain clearance;
- the degree of (spatial) situational awareness;
- terrain depiction: ease of interpretation and
coding for terrain above/below the aircraft; and
- overall rating for the interface tested.
The overall ratings are based on a modified Cooper-
Harper scheme. Statistical tests were applied to the
combined data from the subjects to determine the
individual effect of both the terrain display as well as
predictive terrain proximity alerting algorithms.
The ratings were processed using non-parametric
Wilcoxon (for effect of terrain display) and Mann-
Whitney tests (for effect of alert type). An ANOVA
(analysis of variance) test was also applied for
verification of the nonparametric test results. A
sample of the results is shown below. The results in
the figures indicate a (statistically) significant
difference (p < 0.001), between ratings given with
and without the terrain information display (Figure 4
& Figure 6) In contrast, a significant effect
(0.19 < p < 0.85) was not observed for the forward-
look (predictive) terrain alerting (Figure 5 & Figure
7). This is probably due to the fact that the terrain
display aided the subject’s spatial situational
awareness to the extent of preventing the
development of conditions generating
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Figure 4: Influence of Graphical Terrain Display on
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predictive alerts in most scenarios. Relatively few
predictive alerts were generated in the experiment
(see next section) and it is specifically in those
tactical conditions that the alert is of value.
Figure 8 presents the distribution for use of colour
for the terrain depiction (note missing data). Colour
for the display of terrain above the aircraft was
considered satisfactory, but approximately one-third
of subjects did not fully appreciate the selected
colour for terrain below the aircraft.
The ratings presented in Figure 9 confirm that the
displayed terrain information could be used with
sufficient ease, although the interpretation of terrain
information below the aircraft was rated less
favourably by a number of pilots. Subjects indicated
that the depiction of the terrain below the aircraft
presented undesired distraction and cluttering with
the displayed navigation data, during a number of
approaches. Some comments also suggested a
possible difficulty to discriminate the darkest brown
colour, used to indicate high terrain, from the (black)
ND background. Several pilots expressed a
preference for displaying only terrain above the
aircraft, although this would actually remove some
trend information during climb and descent, which
are crucial phases of flight with respect to terrain
clearance.
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Figure 8: Use of Colour for Terrain Depiction
Above and Below the Aircraft
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Figure 9: Ease of Interpretation of Terrain Contours
The post-test comparative rating data in
Figure 10 indicate that pilots considered that they
were able to detect terrain critical situations
significantly faster with the graphical display (p <
0.01). Subjects were unanimous in their opinion that
the terrain display contributed to reducing workload
for terrain separation during flight.
Figure 10: Speed of Detecting Terrain Critical
Situations
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faster
without
display
no
difference
faster with
terrain
display
reactive alerting
predictive alerting
% subject pilots
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Quantitative Analysis
A total of 140 scenarios were flown. The main
parameters of interests for the quantitative analysis
for each scenario included:
- Perceived terrain awareness (crews were asked
whether they felt comfortable with respect to
terrain clearance at the termination of runs);
- Crew recognition of unsafe vectors and/or
current terrain clearance;
- Terrain alert(s) generated;
- The overall quality of the crew decision (safe vs.
unsafe consequences);
- Compliance with the required SOP for escape
manoeuvres.
For the purposes of this paper only a selection of
results is presented. In the ensuing discussion, the
term “safe” refers specifically to collision with
terrain and/or marginal terrain clearance indicated by
a GPWS/TAWS alert.
Nominal scenarios
Scenarios 2-4 comprised a total of 60 evaluation
trials. As expected crew performance for all four
interface types (display vs. no terrain display, and
reactive vs. predictive alerting) was similar  - all
scenario outcomes being “safe”. Subjects clearly
favoured the terrain display for conducting
operations in the terrain rich environments exposed
to them.
Radar vectoring towards rising terrain
Figure 11 presents an overview of scenario 5a
involving radar vectoring towards rising terrain. The
scenario involved an engine failure shortly after take-
off from Mexico City airport, which required an
immediate return. While the engine failure was
introduced to pose extra workload to the crew, the
aircraft returned to the airport via radar vectors given
by the experiment ATC controller. Part of the radar
vectoring involved flight towards rising terrain. With
the terrain display, terrain critical situations did not
arise. Subjects clearly recognised potential threats in
advance and requested alternative vectors (consistent
with subjective data in). The outcome was “safe” in
100% of the runs with a display. Without the display
two-thirds of the scenarios involved an “unsafe”
situation.
For the alternative scenario (to reduce learning
effect), the crew was initially briefed on a standard
arrival routing into Mexico City. Radar vectors off
the standard routing were given to place the aircraft
in the proximity of rising terrain. The results from
this scenario (5b) are summarised in Figure 12. Forty
three percent of the crews without a terrain display
encountered an “unsafe” situation – terrain alert. All
runs with a terrain display resulted in “safe”
outcomes.
10 crews were exposed
to VISOS1 departure,
with engine failure near
VASOS waypoint
Were vectored
into mountain,
without crew
noticing rising
terrain ahead.
(scenario aborted
before alert)
Passed mountain
with low margin.
Crew declared to
place trust in ATC
for adequate
terrain clearance.
Did not accept
vector into terrain.
Noticed possible
terrain collision,
monitored terrain
display and
requested other
vector
2 crews with
predictive
terrain alerting
7 crews with
terrain display
1 crew with
reactive
terrain alerting
3 crews without
terrain display
Figure 11: Crew Response to Terrain Critical
vectors by ATC Following Engine Failure
For all terrain vectoring scenarios combined (5a-b),
the outcome for 100% of terrain display aided
scenarios was “safe”, whereas 50% of those without
a display resulted in an “unsafe” encounter. For those
crews with a display, no predictive alerts were
generated. It appears that the terrain display provided
sufficient spatial awareness to prevent the
development of conditions that would trigger a
predictive alert. It is likely that subject behaviour
(not uncommon for experiments of this type, see
Ref.6-7) also played a role, e.g. often refusing
descents, requesting new vectors.
10 crews were exposed
to COAPA  arrival and
radar vectors into terrain
before line-up on ILS
Crew or member felt UNEASY
about terrain separation
All felt EASY about
terrain separation
7 crews without  terrain display
(4 reactive, 3 predictive alerting)
3 crews with terrain display
(1 reactive, 2 predictive alerting)
all 3 crews
anticipated terrain
alert or caution and
requested other
vectors
3 crews
predictive alerting
“received” amber
caution”, requested
reclearance
3 crew
reactive alerting
uncomfortable or
monitored raw data
asked reclearance
1 crew
reactive alerting
did not accept
vector towards
rising terrain.
Figure 12: Crew Responses to Terrain Critical
vectors by ATC during Approach
vectoring
Observations of crew behaviour during these two
scenarios clearly suggest that the graphical terrain
information significantly improved the “comfort
level” of the crews during radar vectoring with non-
standard routing. However, it was also observed
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during the high workload engine failure scenario, that
at least two subjects used the terrain display for
navigating away from significant terrain. (This was
deduced from the communications in the flight deck
and subsequent crew actions). When the terrain
display was not available during these scenarios,
observations suggest that subjects found it more
challenging to efficiently correlate their actual
position with the approach charts to verify sufficient
terrain separation.  Crew requests to ATC such as
“state intentions” or revised clearances generally
occurred earlier in those scenarios aided with a
terrain display (consistent with subjective data in
Figure 10).
Incorrect altimeter setting/QNH
The QNH given to crews in scenarios 6a-b placed the
aircraft to within 1000 ft of terrain. Results for
scenario 6a are show in Figure 13. Three of the ten
crews noticed the anomaly at the termination of the
run. Note that in half of these cases (including the
TAWS trials) the basic GPWS “too low terrain” alert
was generated and standard terrain recovery was
executed.
Scenario 6b was a challenging approach in a terrain
rich area with a steep descent using LOC and DME
guidance to (overhead) the airport, followed by visual
manoeuvring including course reversal to the
runaway. The vertical clearance during the approach
was sufficient to prevent alerts being generated, and
none of the ten crews exposed to this scenario
noticed the QNH anomaly. The outcome of all 6b
trials was “safe”.
Figure 13: Altimeter Setting Error - Scenario 6a
Detection of terrain database errors
The potential for erroneous terrain data and the
integrity issues of the onboard database have been
heavily debated in industry. Current systems are
developed on the basis that the information is
supplemental to the basic GPWS and that the
intended use of terrain display is for “pilot
awareness” only, not for “navigation” or “escape
guidance.  There is also speculation in some quarters
that the terrain information presented is extremely
compelling and that a potential exists whereby the
system may be inadvertently misused for navigation.
Scenario 7b included a database error with incorrect
terrain elevation for an area beside the arrival path,
on the published Otumba 2 arrival into Mexico City.
The display presented the mountain as being 2000 ft
higher than actual. The crews were cleared to
descend to an altitude such that the terrain would be
presented on the ND (under normal circumstances it
would not be displayed).
10 crews:
 OTUMBA arrival with
terrain database error
4 crews:
refused descend
or climbed
higher altitude
4 crews questioned
displayed terrain info
4 crews:
did not remark
or did not
perceive conflict
6 crews:
noticed high
terrain on display
2 crews:
would not accept
descent in reality
crews
maintained
12000ft
Figure 14: Crew reaction to terrain database
anomaly
Figure 14 indicates that 40% of the crews did not
question the presentation of information that posed a
potential terrain separation conflict. At the
termination of the scenario, when questioned about
terrain separation, these crews indicated that they felt
“comfortable” with respect to terrain separation.
In scenario 7a, a mountain located approximately 5
NM north of the take-off runway was laterally
displaced (within the TAWS database) below the
published departure routing. It was therefore visible
on the ND below the departure route. Crews were
also in possession of the published SID that depicted
the correct terrain. None of the crews noticed the
database anomaly prior to or during take-off and
departure, even though it was located below the
departure route. An established procedure for
briefing about terrain database errors before takeoff
was not included in the experiment. Note that for
some airports it is not unusual to take-off towards
high terrain. In today's operations, the assumption is
that following SOPs, SIDs and Climb Procedures will
provide the necessary terrain clearance if followed.
received “too low
terrain” alert
made terrain
recovery
3 crews noted
QNH error
10 crews were exposed to
OTUMBA arrival with
altimeter setting error
5 crews
basic GPWS
5 crews
terrain display and forward
look
refused descent to
11000 ft
maintained own
safe altitudes of at
least 12000ft
no terrain alert
generated
suspected GS out
on ILS approach,
made VOR/DME
approach and
went go-around
at MDA because
not visual
no terrain alert
generated
no remarks
received terrain
caution
adjusted descent
no remarks
1
1
1
1 12
3
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The combined data for scenarios 7a-b indicate that in
70% of the cases, crews did not notice the anomalies
on the terrain display.
Crew adherence to procedures after terrain alerts
Scenario 8 investigated the crew reaction to a false
GPWS terrain alert during an approach into
Innsbruck without visual external reference. The
expected reaction was an immediate standard terrain
evasive manoeuvre, i.e. a wings-level, maximum
performance go-around.
7 crews performed
immediate go-around
3 crews continued
descent to MDA and
questioned validity
of the alert
10 crews received a
false GPWS
terrain alert in IMC
Figure 15: Crew reaction to false GPWS alert
Additionally, the 180º course reversal for the
published missed approach procedure implies a
rather demanding manoeuvre given the nature of
surrounding terrain. Although the SOPs called for an
immediate go-around upon receiving any GPWS
warning in IMC, three crews (30%) continued the
approach without performing a go-around. At the
termination of the scenario, the crews stated that the
GPWS alert was disregarded since the aircraft
appeared well stabilised on path, and with the correct
speed. They questioned the validity of the GPWS
warning and stated that terrain clearance appeared to
be satisfactory. These crews were at a heightened
state of alertness carefully monitoring all raw data.
Whilst in the latter scenarios a terrain threat did not
exist, statistics show that failure to respond to GPWS
alerts has played a role in previous accidents1,3. This
has generally been the result of inadequate SOPs
and/or training, and reduced trust in the system due
to previous false/nuisance alerts1,3, 8.
Conclusions
 For the 20 scenarios involving radar vectoring
towards terrain, the outcome for all terrain display
aided runs was “safe”, whereas 50% of those without
a display resulted in an “unsafe” encounter. For those
crews with a display, predictive alerts were not
generated.
- Observations of crew behaviour and subjective
comments during scenarios in which crews were
radar vectored close to rising terrain suggest that
those pilots presented with a terrain display
generally felt more comfortable with respect to
terrain clearance, than those without the display.
- For the 20 scenarios where crews were furnished
with incorrect QNH data, three crews (15%)
noticed the anomaly. In five (25%) cases GPWS
terrain alerts were generated, resulting in execution
of appropriate terrain recovery manoeuvres.
- In 70% of 20 scenarios crews did not notice
anomalies on the terrain display associated with
TAWS database errors.
- Three of 10 crews (30%) continued the approach
without performing a go-around upon receiving a
false GPWS warning in IMC and in a terrain-rich
environment. Whilst these crews questioned the
validity of the alert, this action was not consistent
with the SOPs provided.
- Subjective ratings indicate that the terrain
information on the ND gave rise to a significant
improvement in spatial situational awareness and
speed of detecting terrain critical situations. The
graphical terrain information on the navigation
display was regarded as the most helpful safety
item in providing terrain situational awareness.
- Subjective ratings did not show a significant effect
in terrain awareness resulting from the predictive
alerting. The terrain display provided sufficient
spatial awareness to the extent that the conditions
generating a predictive alert developed relatively
few times. Also the heightened awareness of crew
in an experimental set-up potentially contributed to
this effect. Crews clearly stated their desire for the
predictive alerting capability.
- Many subjects indicated that the terrain display was
so compelling that it would not be difficult to use
the information for navigation, specifically during
high workload situations. This was observed at
times during the evaluation. Issues concerning the
terrain database integrity and the required high
position accuracy, especially in an obstacle rich
environment, currently preclude this function.
- Overall, the terrain display format and selected
colour coding were generally regarded as easy to
understand and use. It should be noted, however,
that the depiction of terrain below the aircraft was
not unanimously appreciated.
- Subjects had little difficulty learning to use the
terrain display and commented about the major
improvement in terrain awareness compared to the
current no terrain display situation in most current
flight decks.
- Many subjects expressed concern about a cluttering
of data on the navigation display close to the
airport, which could obscure essential navigation
information during this critical phase of flight.
- During poor weather conditions in mountainous
terrain, it was regarded as essential to have the
weather radar data available on the navigation
display. Currently, weather and terrain are selected
on alternate NDs.
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Recommendations
a) Product designers should ensure that terrain
information is distinguishable from other display
elements such as traffic, FMS flight path, data
and weather.  The importance of background
terrain and terrain alerting information should be
specified relative to these other data on the
display. The use of colour should not result in
the erroneous interpretation of terrain
information. Means to deal with potential clutter,
especially at low altitudes/during approach,
should be addressed. Strategies to allow the
flight crew to manipulate the shared display of
information may need to be provided.
b) States and operators should support the
implementation of TAWS as proposed by ICAO,
FAA and the FSF CFIT/ALAR Task Force.
c) Operators should provide flight crews with
adequate CFIT awareness and avoidance training
e.g. FSF CFIT Training Aid.
d) Operators employing TAWS/GPWS equipment
should provide flight crews with the necessary
SOPs and training. Correct terrain recovery
procedures and limitations of the TAWS/GPWS
system being utilised should be emphasised.
Both initial and recurrent training should expose
flight crews to high workload scenarios that
demonstrate navigation strategies independent of
the TAWS display.
References
1. Khatwa R, Roelen A L C, An Analysis of
Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain (CFIT) Accidents
of Commercial Operators, 1988 Through 1994,
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR,
Amsterdam, FSF Flight Safety Digest, April-May
1996.
2. Enders J H, et al, Airport Safety: A Study of
Accidents and Available Approach and Landing
Aids, FSF Flight Safety Digest, Alexandria, VA,
March 1996.
3. Khatwa R, Helmreich R L, An Analysis Of
Critical Factors During Approach & Landing in
Accidents and Normal Flight, FSF 11th Annual
European Aviation Safety Seminar, Amsterdam,
March 1999.
4. SAE G-10, Human Interface Criteria for Terrain
Separation Assurance Display Technology, ARP
5108, Warrendale, PA, 1997.
5. De Muynck R J, Khatwa R, Operational
Implications of Ground Collision Avoidance
Systems in Civil Transport Aircraft, NLR-CR-
98325, National Aerospace Laboratory NLR,
Amsterdam, the Netherlands, December 1998.
6. Kuchar J K, Hansman R J, Part-Task Simulator
Evaluation of Advanced Terrain Displays, SAE
Aerotech 93, Costa Mesa, CA, September 1993.
7. Kuchar J K, Hansman R J, An Exploratory Study
of Plan-View Terrain Displays for Air Carrier
Operations, The International Journal of Aviation
Psychology, 3(1), pp. 39-54, 1993.
8. FSF, Killer in Aviation: FSF Task Force Presents
Facts About Approach-and-Landing and
Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain Accidents, Flight
Safety Digest, Alexandria, VA, November 1998-
February 1999.
